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On the Use of Size Premiums,
Arithmetic or Geometric Average Returns,
and Liquidity Premiums in Determining Discount Rates
BY HAL HEATON, PH.D.

I

n recent court cases, a number of technical issues have arisen in determining
appropriate discount rates for use in
the discounted cash flow approach to
valuation. This article examines three
issues, reviews the literature about the
issues, and summarizes the key considerations.
The first issue is whether a size premium is appropriate. The size premium
refers to an adjustment to the discount
rate (also referred to here as the cost
of capital) to reflect a higher required
return for smaller companies. Return
data often are obtained from large,
publicly traded companies, but then
are used to value small companies or
properties. Should a premium be added
to the required return to reflect the fact
that the subject company or property is
much smaller than the companies used
to estimate the required return?
The second issue is the use of historical arithmetic or geometric averages to
determine the equity risk premium in
the capital asset-pricing model (CAPM).
Most appraisers use historical return
data from the stock market and compare

those returns to the historical returns
from Treasury bonds to estimate the additional return that investors require to
invest in the stock market rather than in
Treasuries. However, in comparing the
historical returns, should the arithmetic
or geometric average returns be used to
calculate the difference in returns?
The third issue is whether a liquidity
premium is appropriate when illiquid
investments or properties are being valued. Often appraisers obtain return or
cost-of-capital data from liquid, publicly
traded securities. Liquidity refers to the
ease or cost of buying or selling an investment. Should a premium be added
to data from traded securities to reflect
the fact the tangible, physical properties
take much longer to sell, are much more
expensive to sell than publicly traded
stocks or bonds, and require much larger
discounts in price to sell quickly?
Each of these questions is addressed
in this article.

The Size Premium
Appraisers are often asked to value
properties that are small compared to
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publicly traded companies. Return and
cost-of-capital data often are available
only from large, publicly traded companies. A large number of researchers have
documented market evidence that small
companies have higher returns than the
CAPM indicates. The CAPM estimates
the required return on equity with the
equation
Required return = Rf + β(Rm− Rf )
where Rf is the risk-free rate, Rm is the
market expected return, and β (beta)
is the measure of systematic risk and
incorporates both the volatility of the
investment and the correlation of the investment with the market. (For a sample
of research articles that document this
size premium, see the Suggested Reading
section at the end of this article.) In each
of its Stocks, Bonds, Bills, and Inflation Yearbooks (2007a; 2007b), Ibbotson Associates
devotes an entire chapter to the historical
risk premiums above the risk premiums
suggested by the CAPM for companies of
various sizes. The evidence is overwhelming that the smaller the company, the
higher the required return.
There is speculation about why the
size premium exists. Some believe that
small companies are subject to higher
risk since single events such as the death
of a key executive, the loss of a key customer, the change of a single technology,
or the introduction of a new competitor
has a much larger impact on a small
company than on a large company.
Smaller companies often are in weaker
competitive positions, have fewer facilities and product diversification, and can
be more vulnerable to regulatory risk or
labor disruptions.
Others believe that the premium can
be largely a liquidity premium. It is much
harder and more expensive to sell a
position in a small company than in a
large company. The bid-ask spreads of
the traded shares for small companies
are usually a much larger percentage of
price than for larger companies. Fewer
analysts issue reports on small companies


primarily since there are fewer investors.
Small companies can have a handful of
investors that control a large percentage
of outstanding shares. All these factors
can make it more difficult to buy or sell
a position in a small company.
Another line of research indicates
that because of the difficulty in obtaining information on small companies, it
may take longer for the share prices to
react to new information. As a result, the
usual method for estimating CAPM betas
for a company (ordinary least squares
regression) leads to a beta estimate
that understates the risk. In a Journal of
Portfolio Management article, researchers
found that using a multiple regression
technique on returns, and also the
lagged returns, corrects for much of this
bias; the correct beta must be estimated
by adding the beta on returns and the
beta on the lagged returns together (Ibbotson, Kaplan, and Peterson 1997).
The size premium affects not only the
cost of equity but also the cost of debt.
Small companies with the same credit
ratios simply pay higher rates than larger
companies with the same ratios. Standard and Poor’s, an agency that evaluates
the risk of the debt of issuers, mentions a
number of factors that can cause a small
company to have a higher cost of credit
than a large company:
For example, the fact that a company may
only have one major production facility
normally is regarded as an area of vulnerability. Similarly, reliance on one product
creates risk, even if the product is highly
successful. … size turns out to be significantly correlated to ratings. The reason:
size often provides a measure of diversification, and/or affects competitive position.
(Standard and Poor’s 2006)
A Wall Street Journal article also cited
this phenomenon:
…But all of this is a double-whammy
for smaller companies, which are now
penalized on both the equity and debt
sides of their capital. It is well known
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that small companies’ stocks don’t get the
analyst coverage or the market valuations
awarded to bigger concerns. But investors
have also become notably more cautious
about bonds and loans from smaller or
less credit-worthy companies.
“Several years ago we were much more
willing to look at deals that were below
$100 million,” says Kevin Mathews,
senior portfolio manager at Pilgrim
America High Yield Fund in Phoenix.
“To look at anything below that size now
it has to be super-compelling.” While a
year ago the minimum was $100 million,
now “we tend to look at anything $150
million or bigger.”
The change in demand can be seen clearly
in the extra yields investors are demanding on smaller deals. Since 1994, bond
issues smaller than $100 million have
paid an average 0.48 of a percentage
point more yield than issues larger than
$300 million, says Steven Ruggiero, head
of high-yield securities research at Chase
Securities Inc. But the spread has soared
since last fall’s credit crunch, rising from
a slim 0.07 percentage point during the
flush times of May 1998, peaking at 1.87
percentage points this April and currently
at 1.44 percentage points, nearly a full
percentage point higher than the longterm average …. (Scherer 1999, C1)
Some appraisers have cited an article
indicating that the size premium can
be an illusion caused by a delisting bias
(Shumway 1997, 327–340). When a
company gets in trouble, the value of its
debt or equity falls, and as a result, it is
delisted from the exchange that trades
the security. Since the data from these
securities are then eliminated from some
databases, they are not included in the
average returns. If the negative returns
from these companies were included,
the returns would be lower. However,
the data in this article show that the
bias is trivial for all but the very smallest companies, and yet the evidence is
documented in firms much larger than

those for which the bias may exist.
A PricewaterhouseCoopers study
showed that when companies were
grouped by size into 25 subcategories,
even in the 25th group of companies
the delisting bias was only 22 basis points
(Grabowski and King 1997). This bias
was trivial compared to the size premiums demonstrated in the data. The
delisting bias certainly does not explain
the size premium.
In short, size affects cost of capital and
must be adjusted for in a cost of capital
determination.

Arithmetic Versus Geometric
Means for the Market Risk
Premium
Another issue stems from the use of
historical arithmetic versus geometric
means. The Stocks, Bonds, Bills, and Inflation Classic Edition Yearbook (Ibbotson
Associates 2007b) indicated that the
arithmetic average return of common
stocks from 1926 through 2006 was 12.3
percent per year, whereas the geometric
average return was 10.4 percent per year.
This represents almost a 2 percent difference in average return.
The key issue for appraisers is which
average represents the correct average
to use in determining the equity risk
premium for the CAPM. The equity risk
premium is the portion of the CAPM
equation in parentheses:
Required return = Rf + β(Rm − Rf ).
Ibbotson Associates makes it clear that
the arithmetic average is the appropriate
average:
The equity risk premium data presented
in this book are arithmetic average risk
premia as opposed to geometric average risk
premia. The arithmetic average equity risk
premium can be demonstrated to be most
appropriate when discounting future cash
flows. For use as the expected equity risk
premium in either the CAPM or the building block approach, the arithmetic mean
or the simple difference of the arithmetic
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means of stock market returns and riskless rates is the relevant number. This is
because both the CAPM and the building
block approach are additive models, in
which the cost of capital is the sum of its
parts. The geometric average is more appropriate for reporting past performance
…. (Ibbotson Associates 2007b)
Financial textbooks that cite the use of
historical data to estimate the equity risk
premium for the future indicate that, if
historical data are used, the arithmetic
average is the appropriate average:
If the cost of capital is estimated from
historical returns or risk premiums,
use arithmetic averages, not compound
annual rates of return. (Brealey and
Myers 2003)
The issue is muddied by a few authors
who choose to use the geometric average:
Conventional wisdom argues for the use
of the arithmetic average. In fact, if annual returns are uncorrelated over time
and our objective was to estimate the risk
premium for the next year, the arithmetic
average is the best unbiased estimate of
the premium. In reality, however, there are
strong arguments that can be made for the
use of geometric averages. First, empirical
studies seem to indicate that returns on
stocks are negatively correlated over time.
Consequently, the arithmetic average
return is likely to overstate the premium.
(Damodaran 2006, 98)

The arithmetic average is the best estimate
of future expected returns because all
possible paths are given equal weighting.
… Empirical research … indicates that
a significant long-term negative autocorrelation exists in stock returns. The
implication is that the true market risk
premium lies between the arithmetic and
geometric averages. (Copeland, Koller,
and Murrin 2000, 218–221)
The last two citations are correct that,
historically, there has been negative
autocorrelation in stock returns. The
problem is that if this were true going
forward, investors could earn excess
returns in the market by buying after
periods in which the market has fallen
and selling after periods in which the
market has risen. If it were this easy to
beat the market, all investors would do it
and prices would move in such a way that
the opportunity would disappear. Even if
it were true in the past, it cannot be true
for future expected returns.
To show that the arithmetic average is
the correct average for both short-term
and long-term returns, consider the following example.
Toss a coin three times. If it comes
up heads, you double your money. If it
comes up tails, you lose 50 percent of
your money. Start with $1. Table 1 illustrates the possible outcomes.
What is your expected return on the
next toss?
With 50 percent probability, you will
have $0.50, or a –50 percent return.

Table 1. Arithmetic mean as outcome predictor—Coin-toss example

Outcomes
TTT
TTH
THT
THH
HHH
HHT
HTH
HTT



Returns
–50%, –50%, –50%
–50%, –50%, 100%
–50%, 100%, –50%
–50%, 100%, 100%
100%, 100%, 100%
100%, 100%, –50%
100%, –50%, 100%
100%, –50%, –50%
Long-run average

Ending
Amount
$0.125
$0.50
$0.50
$2.00
$8.00
$2.00
$2.00
$0.50
$1.95

Arithmetic
Mean
–50%
0%
0%
50%
100%
50%
50%
0%
25%

Geometric
Mean
–50%
–21%
–21%
26%
100%
26%
26%
–21%
8.1%
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With 50 percent probability, you will have
$2.00, or a 100% return. Therefore the
“expected” outcome is ($2.00 + $0.50)/2
= $1.25, which is a 25 percent expected
return, the arithmetic mean. Hence the
arithmetic—not the geometric mean—
best estimates the expected return in the
short term.
Note too that the long run expected
payoff to the above game is $1 x (1.253)
= $1.95, not $1 x (1.0813). Again, the
arithmetic mean, not the geometric
mean, is the best estimate of the future
outcome.
The arithmetic mean is the appropriate average for both long-term and
short-term expected returns.

Liquidity Premium
Most return data are obtained from markets in which investments trade easily,
quickly, and at low cost. This presents a
problem when the subject property is
physical operating property, real estate,
or a privately held company that is not
actively traded on an exchange. It also
is a problem for a small company that is
traded but has larger bid-ask spreads for its
shares or so few investors that a large premium or discount to the last trade must be
offered to find a new buyer or seller.
The lack of an active market leads to
a substantially higher required rate of
return by investors, because of the time
and cost involved for investors to sell
their investment and the difficulty and
expense of getting cash, which may be
unexpectedly needed.
This is sometimes called a risk premium, but it technically is not a risk
premium in the classical sense. Risk
refers to the inability to forecast a price.
In general, the more difficult it is to
estimate a future price, the higher the
risk. Risk also depends on the correlation of the error with the overall market
or economy. Two investments can be
equally difficult to forecast and hence
have the same risk. However, if the first
investment takes a long time to sell or has
high transaction costs and the second

can be converted to cash quickly at low
cost, investors require a much higher
return on the first.
The higher required return for the
lack of an active market is referred to as
a liquidity premium. This premium must
be added to return estimates based on
data from actively traded stocks when the
subject property is not actively traded. For
example, betas and risk-free rates used in
the CAPM almost always are based on data
from actively traded securities.
The difference in price of investments
without active markets when compared
to investments with active markets
is referred to as a liquidity discount.
Numerous studies give overwhelming
evidence of discounts of 20–40 percent
for stocks that are not actively traded
compared to equities that are actively
traded (see Pratt [1989] for a more
detailed discussion of this point). Such
studies have looked at sales of restricted,
or letter, stocks. These stocks have all the
rights and privileges of common stock
but are not traded on an exchange.
Owners of this stock can sell this stock
only in privately arranged transactions,
not on an exchange.
One study (Silber 1991) found discounts averaging 33.75 percent for
transactions involving restricted stock
when compared to the price at which the
common stock was trading at the same
time on an exchange. The Internal Revenue Service has allowed a 35 percent
discount from the estimated value for equity not traded on an exchange to reflect
the lack of liquidity (Pratt 1989).
Financial research has clearly determined the value of liquidity:
Liquidity (or marketability) is a key attribute of capital assets, and it strongly
affects their pricing. … investors prefer
to commit capital to liquid investments,
which can be traded quickly and at low
cost whenever the need arises. Investments
with less liquidity must offer higher
expected returns to attract investors.
(Amihud and Mendelson 1991)
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…liquidity-increasing financial policies
may increase the value of the firm. This
was demonstrated for our numerical example …. If the spread is reduced to 0.486%
[from 3.2%] (as in our low-spread portfolio group), our estimates imply that the
value of the asset would increase to $75.8,
about a 50% increase …. (Amihud and
Mendelson 1986)
Our study contributes to the academic
literature since we believe we offer the
cleanest and most precise measures of
the value of liquidity. Due to the unique
experimental design inherent in REITs,
especially the precision of underlying asset
values, we are able to not only verify a link
between liquidity and required returns
but we are able to accurately quantify
these gains. … Specifically, we find that
exchange trading increases shareholder
wealth by around 10–15% at the margin
compared to the relatively illiquid real
estate market. However, our estimates of
wealth creation jump to around 23%
when comparing exchange traded claims
to nontrading ones. (Benveniste, Cappozza, and Seguin 2001)
Securities that can be converted quickly and
cheaply into cash offer relatively low yields.
(Brealey and Myers 2003, 891)
The rate of return on investment combines
a safe rate with a premium to compensate
the investor for risk and the illiquidity of
invested capital. (Appraisal Institute
2001, 492)
The research is overwhelming in
indicating higher rates of return and corresponding lower prices for less-liquid
investments.

Summary
In recent litigation, the issues of size and
liquidity premiums have been a central
issue. The question of whether to use
a risk premium in the CAPM based on
the difference between arithmetic or
geometric historical average returns
also has been intensely debated. The
research is clear that a size premium and
10

a liquidity premium are warranted. The
logic and evidence also are compelling
that if historical returns are used, the
arithmetic mean returns should be used
to determine the equity risk premium for
use in the CAPM.
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